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This paper offers an analysis of refugee claims on grounds of bisexuality. After 
discussing the grounds on which sexual minorities may qualifY for refugee status 
under international refugee law, the paper empirically assesses the success rates of 
bisexual refugee claimants in three major host states: Canada, the United States, and 
Australia. It concludes that bisexuals are significantly less successful than other 
sexual minority groups in obtaining refugee status in those countries. Through an 
examination of selected published decisions involving bisexual refugee claimants, 
the author identifies two main areas for concern that may partly account for the 
difficulties that bisexual refugee claimants encounter: the invisibility of bisexuality as 
a sexual identity, and negative views held by some refugee claims adjudicators 
towards bisexuality as well as the reluctance of some adjudicators to grant refugee 
status to sexual minorities who differ from gay and lesbian identities as traditionally 
understood. 
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The world is not to be divided into sheep and goats ... It is a fundamental of taxonomy that 
nature rarely deals with discrete categories. Only the human mind invents categories and 
tries to force facts into separated pigeon-holes. The sooner we leam this concerning human 
sexual behavior the sooner we shall reach a sound understanding of the realities of sex. 1 
Introduction 
Bisexuality tends to be invisible in human rights practice and discourse, even in areas that 
are otherwise comparatively sensitive to sexual minority issues.2 For example, at the time of 
writing, the European Human Rights Reports lists 68 cases that mentioned lesbians or 
homosexuals, but only four that mentioned bisexuals.3 Similarly, the Canadian Human 
Rights Tribunal referred to lesbians or homosexuals in 24 decisions, but to bisexuals in 
only two decisions.4 An equally revealing picture of the invisibility of bisexuality is 
evident in the names of prominent non-governmental organisations fighting for the 
human rights of sexual minorities. Consider, for example, the International Gay and 
Lesbian Human Rights Commission,S the International Gay and Lesbian Association,6 
the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force,7 the Gay and Lesbian Rights Lobby,S the 
Lesbian and Gay Equality Project,9 and Equality for Gays and Lesbians. lO 
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In light of such invisibility, this paper aims to bring greater attention to bisexuality in 
one particular area of international human rights: international sexual minority refugee law. 
An individual who is outside his or her countly of origin, and who has a well-founded 
fear of persecution on account of his or her sexual orientation, meets the international legal 
definition of a refugee and is eligible for refugee status. II However, as I will demonstrate 
in this paper, bisexuals who allege a feared persecution on account of their sexual identity 
are frequently unable to secure refugee status. I argue that among the primary causes of the 
difficulties bisexual refugee claimants encounter are negative views held by some refugee 
claims adjudicators towards bisexuality, as well as the reluctance of some adjudicators to 
grant refugee status to sexual minorities who differ from gay and lesbian identities as 
traditionally understood. 
My argument will proceed by first providing a brief introduction to international sexual 
minority refugee law. Then, I will examine the experiences of bisexual refugees in 
three major host states: Canada, the United States, and Australia. Through both quantitative 
and qualitative analysis of these experiences, I will demonstrate that bisexual refugee 
claimants have more difficulty securing refugee status than do other groups of sexual 
minorities. Finally, I will examine some of the reasons why bisexuals encounter difficulties 
securing refugee status. 
Before turning to my main argument, it is pertinent to first address the terminology used 
in this paper. Debates regarding appropriate labels for sexual behaviours, sexual identities, 
and sexual orientations are one of the mainstays of discussions about what human rights 
have to say about sexual minorities. 12 One source of these debates is that, regardless of 
which terminology one chooses to embrace, it will inevitably fail to accord with the self-
understanding of many of those who are supposed to be covered by the terminology. 
There have, for example, been sharp disagreements over terms such as MSM (men who 
have sex with men), WSW (women who have sex with women), 'homosexual', 'gay', 
LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender), and 'queer'Y Some of the concerns 
expressed over such terms include whether a term occludes distinct sexual identities and 
complex intersectional considerations related to gender, class, race, language, religion, 
physical ability, HIV status, and so on; 14 whether one inappropriately confiates 
(or bifurcates) sexual behaviours and sexual identities/ 5 and whether one excludes 
particular groups that ought to be included. 16 Moreover, cross-cultural dimensions add a 
further level of complexity to these debates, because even if one's chosen terminology is 
accepted within one community, it may be inappropriate in communities located in other 
regions of the world. 17 
In this paper, I adopt the general term 'sexual minorities'. I choose the term because it 
has relatively unsettled and imprecise boundaries. This imprecision is helpful, as it allows 
the term to include all persons seeking protection from persecution on account of hetero-
normativity,18 irrespective of their precise sexual identities or sexual behaviours. 19 
One further terminological matter remains: my use of the term 'bisexuality'. Debates 
about appropriate labels are, if anything, even more pronounced with respect to bisexuality 
than to other sexual minority identities.2o Once again, cross-cultural considerations muddy 
the waters. Some of those characterised in one locale as 'bisexual' may be viewed in others 
as 'homosexual' or 'heterosexual,?1 In the context of this paper, it is necessary to note in 
particular that a person who would otherwise identify as exclusively homosexual may be 
coerced into different-sex sexual relations or into adopting bisexual identities through 
h . . 22 etero-normatJve persecutIOn. 
This paper attempts to sidestep some of these debates over the definition of 'bisexuality' 
because my interest is not to set out a particular definition and advocate its use by refugee 
claims adjudicators. Rather, my interest is to explore how sexual minority refugee 
claimants whose cases involve allegations of non-gender-exclusive sexuality are treated 
in the refugee determination systems in several major host states. In this paper, therefore, 
I use the term 'bisexual' loosely to mean a person whose sexual orientation, sexual identity, 
or sexual behaviour is not directed exclusively towards persons of one particular sex or 
gender?3 
International refugee law and sexual minorities 
It is well settled in international refugee law that non-citizens facing persecution abroad on 
account of their sexual orientations are eligible for refugee status?4 The 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees,25 however, does not explicitly include sexual orien-
tation. The Convention defines a refugee as any person who 
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
of that country.26 
Some sexual minority refugees have - with varying degrees of success - attempted to argue 
that their fear of persecution stemmed from their 'political opinion'. 27 The argument has, thus 
far, proved to be particularly effective for human rights activists who encounter hetero-
normative persecution as a result of their efforts to enhance the rights of sexual minorities.28 
Political opinion, however, has been interpreted vel)' broadly in international refugee law to 
cover 'any opinion on any matter in which the machinel)' of State, government, and policy 
may be engaged'.29 As a result, one could plausibly argue that 'political opinion' covers 
sexual minorities who face persecution for challenging both traditional gender norms as 
well as the inevitability of heterosexuality. With respect to the former (i.e. traditional 
gender norms), the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) Guidelines 
on Gender-Related Persecution state that political opinion 'may include an opinion as to 
gender roles. It would also include non-conformist behaviour which leads the persecutor to 
impute a political opinion. ,30 This is significant because persecution targeting sexual min-
orities often aims to 'foster and maintain "appropriate" gender role behaviour' .31 Meanwhile, 
with regard to the latter (i.e. challenging the inevitability of heterosexuality), the argument 
would find some support in the commonly made claim that the heterosexually structured 
family is the fundamental socio-economic unit, one that is supported through a variety of 
state policies?2 Sexual minorities, by their vel)' existence, may be understood as challenging 
both the heterosexual family and the state policies that support it. In other words, sexual 
minorities may have political opinions regarding gender roles and the heterosexual family 
imputed to them, and may be persecuted on that basis?3 
One might also plausibly contend that hetero-normative persecution sometimes 
involves not only persecution on grounds of 'political opinion' but also persecution on 
grounds of 'religion,.34 The UNHCR Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution, for 
example, state that 
[i]n certain States, the religion assigns particular roles or behavioural codes to women and men 
respectively. Where a woman does not fulfil her assigned role or refuses to abide by the codes, 
and is punished as a consequence, she may have a well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of religion. Failure to abide by such codes may be perceived as evidence that a 
woman holds unacceptable religious opinions regardless of what she actually believes. 3s 
Just as women who are persecuted for transgressing gender roles or behavioural codes 
prescribed by religious dogmas may - irrespective of their actual religious beliefs36 -
be understood as facing persecution on grounds of religion, so too can sexual minorities.37 
Indeed, as Nicole LaViolette notes, many sexual minority refugee claims involve fears of 
persecution where the claimant's '[h]omosexuality is not only perceived as non-conformity 
to gender-specific roles but also ... a crime against religion,.38 The argument would seem 
especially warranted where the agents of persecution are in one way or another tied to reli-
gious institutions - which is not unlikely given the longstanding hetero-normative tra-
ditions in most major world religions. It would also be worth pursuing such an argument 
in countries where religious and state institutions are not sharply divided.39 
Although persecution on grounds of either religion or political opinion presents avenues 
for securing refugee status that are, in principle, open at least to some sexual minorities 
facing hetero-normative persecution, it is much more common for sexual minority 
refugee claimants to argue that they meet the refugee definition because they face persecu-
tion on grounds of their 'membership in a particular social group,.40 
One of the leading cases on what exactly constitutes a 'particular social group' is the 
Canadian Supreme Court decision, Ward v. Canada. 41 In Ward, Justice La Forest explained 
that there were three distinct types of 'particular social groups' for the purpose of the 
refugee definition: 
(1) groups defined by an innate or unchangeable characteristic; 
(2) groups whose members voluntarily associate for reasons so fundamental to their 
human dignity that they should not be forced to forsake the association; and 
(3) groups associated by a former voluntary status, unalterable due to its historical 
permanence.42 
Offering examples of each of the three types of social groups, Justice La Forest stated 
that '[ t ]he first category would embrace . . . sexual orientation'. 43 In other words, sexual 
minorities facing persecution qualify for refugee protection as 'particular social groups' 
because, according to Justice La Forest, sexual orientation is an 'innate or unchangeable 
I h .. ,44 persona c aractenst1c . 
This passage has been cited with approval by courts in jurisdictions around the world45 
and by the UNHCR Guidelines on Social Group Claims.46 However, there has been some 
recent movement away from this approach to sexual minority refugee jurisprudence. 
Following Ward, a number of commentators have sharply critiqued Justice La Forest's 
reliance on the purported 'innate or immutable' nature of sexual orientation.47 According to 
these commentators, there are both strategic and symbolic benefits in grounding sexual 
minority refugee protection within the second category of 'particular social groups' ident-
ified in Ward: groups that associate 'for reasons so fundamental to their human dignity that 
they should not be forced to forsake the association. ,48 It is worth noting that this second 
category in Ward - which I will call the fundamental human dignity approach - has 
been given a slightly modified interpretation in subsequent international refugee law, 
most significantly through the UNHCR Guidelines on Social Group Claims.49 According 
to these Guidelines, the focus of the fundamental human dignity approach is not on 
whether members of a particular social group actually 'voluntarily associate', but rather 
on the question of whether the characteristic that the group shares is 'fundamental to iden-
tity, conscience or the exercise of one's human rights,.5o 
The strategic advantage of embracing the fundamental human dignity approach is that 
the approach insulates sexual minority refugee protection from any possible shifts in 
research in science or social sciences on the 'causes' of sexual orientation. Views on the 
'causes' of sexual orientation have long been hotly contested by scientists and social scientists 
alike. Many researchers suggest that sexual orientation is either related to genetics or to early 
childhood experiences (or to some combination of the two). Thus, they understand sexual 
orientation as by and large a fixed psychosocial characteristic.51 Other researchers, 
however, suggest that sexual orientation can and does change over time. Admittedly, some 
of such research is associated with those who controversially assert that homosexuality is a 
psychological condition that can be 'cured,52 through so-called 'conversion therapy' or 
'sexual reorientation therapy,.53 As a study on political agendas in conversion therapy notes, 
Current approaches tend to utilize religious and psychodynamic principles that define 
homosexuality as a 'condition' that results when a child does not receive sufficient love 
through the attachment to the same-sex parent ... For the sake of salvation, sexual reorientation 
programs tend to rely on the power of God and prayer to help the repentant homosexual 
strengthen willpower, reduce desire, and limit behavior ... Heterosexual marriage and children 
are promised, which sexual reorientation therapists consider a healthy adaptation to a hetero-
sexual world. 54 
However, some of the research finding that sexual orientation is mutable has emerged from 
scholars who do not hold disparaging views about homosexuality. Rather, these scholars 
emphasise the socially contingent and shifting aspects of human sexuality - including hetero-
sexuality - and argue that human sexuality is too complex to be fully captured by models that 
hold that people simply 'are' homosexual or heterosexual (or any other sexual identity).55 
Indeed, one of the primary aims of these scholars - often called 'queer theorists' - is to 
elucidate the power politics at play in what they view as the processes of social regulation 
that produce individuals who 'perform' naturalised sexual identities.56 
What I want to emphasise here is that the debate over the 'immutability' of sexual 
orientation remains controversial and neither side of the debate has an exclusive claim to 
represent the views held by sexual minorities. In this context, it seems unwise to use the 
presumed 'immutability' of sexual orientation as the reason why sexual minorities facing 
hetero-normative persecution are entitled to refugee status. The risk is that, if the view 
of sexual orientation advocated by those on the 'mutability' side of the debate becomes 
dominant, then sexual minorities facing persecution will no longer meet the refugee 
definition. Nancy Knauer cautions against the risky strategy of tying sexual minority 
rights to a particular strain of evidence in science or social sciences regarding the nature 
and causes of sexual orientation: 
By premising their rights claims ... on assertions of immutable status, pro-gay advocates have 
entrusted the success of a major social and political movement to the reliability of a few incon-
clusive studies concerning, inter alia, the size of the hypothalamus in the cadavers of gay men 
and the inner ears oflesbians.57 
One strategic advantage, then, of grounding sexual minority refugee claims on the founda-
tional principle that no one should be required to change their sexual orientations, rather 
than on the idea that no one can change their sexual orientations, is that sexual minorities 
will be able to secure refugee status irrespective of the ebbs and flows of the debates on the 
'causes' of sexual orientation. 
Just as important as this strategic advantage of the fundamental human dignity approach 
is that the immutability approach to sexual minority refugee protection carries problematic 
symbolic implications. To see these implications, let us consider why Justice La Forest 
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attached relevance to whether sexual orientation is an immutable characteristic. It is 
important to note, in this regard, that Justice La Forest inferred the three types of 
'particular social groups' mentioned above from the human rights commitments 
animating international refugee law. 58 One of these human rights commitments inheres 
in the basic objection to differential treatment based on characteristics for which human 
beings cannot normatively be held responsible. If they are not responsible for their 
sexual orientations - if sexual orientations are, in other words, immutable personal 
characteristics - then differential treatment based on sexual orientation runs foul of this 
objection. Yoshino characterises these sorts of arguments as involving what he calls the 
'immutability defense'. 59 As Yoshino puts it, '[g]ays often defend their homosexuality 
by characterizing it as an immutable trait ... Immutability has exonerative force because 
of the widely held belief that it is abhorrent to penalize individuals for matters beyond 
their control. ,60 
Compare the message the immutability defence approach sends with that which inheres 
in the alternative foundation for sexual minority protection, the fundamental human dignity 
approach, which holds that no human beings should be required to change their sexual 
orientations. The latter approach sends the message that sexual orientation is so closely 
connected to a person's fundamental human dignity that persecution aimed at enforcing 
'compulsory heterosexuality,61 and traditional gender norms62 is a human rights violation 
of such magnitude as to trigger refugee protection. Rather than presenting sexual minorities 
as unpopular minorities in need of protection because individuals are not responsible 
for their sexual orientations, this approach presents hetero-normative persecution as an 
impermissible trespass upon a person's fundamental human dignity. 63 
In recent years, courts and refugee claims tribunals in several jurisdictions have begun 
to embrace this alternative approach to sexual minority jurisprudence, perhaps due to its 
strategic and symbolic advantages. For example, in Hernandez-Montiel v. LN.S.,64 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that sexual minorities fell 
within both the first and second categories of 'particular social groups' identified in 
Ward. 65 That is to say, one reason why sexual minorities persecuted abroad are entitled 
to refugee status and asylum in the United States is that 'sexual orientation and sexual iden-
tity ... are so fundamental to one's identity that a person should not be required to abandon 
them,.66 Tribunals in Australia67 and New Zealand68 have come to similar conclusions and 
have refused to consider sexual minority refugee protection solely through the lens of pro-
tection for groups defined by innate and unchangeable characteristics. 69 
In principle, then, the ultimate rationale for sexual minority refugee protection appears 
to be shifting away from the contention that sexual orientation is an immutable character-
istic, and towards the view that persecutory enforcement of compulsory heterosexuality and 
traditional gender norms is an infringement of fundamental human dignity. However, closer 
attention to case law reveals that sexual minority refugee claims continue in practice to be 
measured against relatively rigid and immutable understandings of sexual orientations. 
Nowhere is this clearer than in the experience of bisexual refugee claimants.7o 
The experience of bisexual refugee claimants in selected host states 
Bisexual refugee claimants' experience, while varying to some degree across host states, 
shares two major features: (1) their presence in the host states' refugee jurisprudence is 
largely invisible and (2) they face extremely low refugee claim success rates. Both these 
features are evident in the experience of bisexual refugee claimants in three major host 
states: Canada, the United States, and Australia. 
Canada 
In Canada, the earliest published case explicitly involving a bisexual refugee claimant was 
decided in 2000.71 The decision involved a refugee claimant from Mexico who self-
identified as a 'bisexual man who prefers men and being a transvestite,72 and who had 
been repeatedly brutalised by the Mexican police.73 The claimant obtained refugee 
status, largely on the basis of persuasive country condition evidence involving frequent 
reports of violence directed towards transvestites in Mexico.74 
However, in the following years, other bisexual refugee claimants have been largely 
unsuccessful in obtaining refugee protection. For example, according to a recent study 
undertaken by the author, no explicitly bisexual refugee claimant was granted refugee 
status in reported Canadian refugee decisions between 2001 and 2004.75 In evaluating 
this figure, it should be noted that the study identified only 11 reported refugee decisions 
involving bisexuals, out of a total of 115 reported sexual minority refugee decisions.76 
Moreover, it should be borne in mind that only a small fraction of Canadian refugee 
decisions are published, and those that are published cannot be taken to be a representative 
sample of all refugee determinations. 77 
To get a clearer picture of how sexual minority refugee claims - including bisexual 
refugee claims - are actually being decided in Canada, it is possible to use a formal 
request through the Access to Information Ace8 to obtain data directly from the database 
of the administrative tribunal responsible for refugee determinations in Canada, that is, 
the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB).79 
According to data acquired through a formal Access to Information request regarding 
refugee determinations by the IRB in 2006,80 bisexual refugee claims made up approximately 
8% of sexual minority refugee claims decided by the IRB in 2006 (44 out of 577 decisions). 
The success rate for sexual minority claimants (58%) exceeded the average success rates at 
the IRB for the year (54%). However, the success rate for bisexual refugee claimants 
(39%) was significantly lower. It is, moreover, worth noting that while the success rates 
for gay male and lesbian claimants were virtually identical (60%), cases involving gay 
men (424) significantly outnumbered cases involving lesbians (100). In cases involving 
bisexuals, male claimants (33) once again outnumbered female claimants (11), but whereas 
success rates for gay and lesbian claimants matched closely, success rates for male bisexual 
claimants (33%) were lower than those for female bisexual claimants (55%).81 
The author's previous study, which examined all (that is, reported and unreported) 
sexual minority refugee decisions by the IRB in 2004, came to mostly similar conclusions. 
According to that study, bisexual refugee claims made up 7% of sexual minority claims 
(100 out of 1351 decisions). Moreover, the success rate in sexual minority refugee 
claims (49%) slightly exceeded the average IRB success rates for the year (46%), and far 
exceeded the success rate in bisexual refugee claims (25%).82 
It appears then that, notwithstanding the success of the claimant in the first reported 
refugee decision involving a bisexual in Canada, bisexual refugee claimants have had a 
difficult time obtaining refugee status in Canada, compared with both refugee claimants 
in general and sexual minority refugee claimants in particular. 83 
United States 
Although Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, a leading US case, explicitly considered the possi-
bility that framing sexual minority refugee law exclusively in terms of homosexuality 
and heterosexuality may be 'too restrictive', 84 reported cases involving bisexual applicants 
for refugee status and asylum in the United States have been rare.85 Indeed, there has only 
been one federal court decision explicitly involving a bisexual applicant, and in that case the 
applicant's bisexuality was mentioned only in passing.86 Moreover, the first - and thus far 
only - United States Board of Immigration Appeals case involving an explicitly bisexual 
applicant for refugee status and asylum currently reported in legal databases was decided in 
2007.87 In that case an HIV-positive bisexual from Mexico was unsuccessful in obtaining 
refugee status and asylum in the United States.88 
There are currently no statistics available on unreported average grant rates in refugee 
applications in the United States involving sexual minorities.89 However, it is possible to 
get a sense of what such statistics might reveal by using information obtained from the 
Asylum Documentation Program (ADP) of the International Gay and Lesbian Human 
Rights Commission.9o From 1994 to 2007, the ADP assisted sexual minority refugee 
claimants, and their advocates, by providing documentation on the conditions faced by 
sexual minorities in particular countries abroad. When the ADP was contacted for assist-
ance, staff recorded details of their cases in a database. Where possible, the outcomes of 
the cases in which the ADP provided assistance were also recorded. 
According to the ADP's internal database,91 bisexual cases were rarely reported to the 
ADP. In fact, bisexual cases represented less than 1 % of the cases involving sexual minority 
refugee claimants in the United States that were reported to the ADP from 1994 to 2007 (38 
cases out of 4241). Cases involving bisexual men (35) were more frequently reported than 
those involving bisexual women (3), just as reported cases involving gay men (3576) were 
much more common than those involving lesbians (627). 
As with the Canadian data, the grant rate for bisexuals (5%) was significantly lower than 
the rate for gay men and lesbians (17%) in cases where the final outcomes were reported 
to the ADP. However, caution must be exercised when interpreting these statistics. In par-
ticular, the reported grant rates likely significantly understated the actual grant rates 
in sexual minority refugee claims, in large part because, due to limited resources, the 
ADP was not able to systematically determine the outcomes of all cases in which they 
offered assistance.92 As a result, data regarding refugee claim outcomes are only available 
in 14% of the cases involving bisexuals, and 21% of the cases involving gay men 
and lesbians reported to the ADP. Nonetheless, it seems significant that in the data collected 
by the ADP, whereas the grant rates of gay men (17%) and lesbians (17%) matched closely, 
the grant rates of gay men and lesbians (17%), on one hand, and bisexuals (5%), on the 
other, diverge significantly. 
Australia 
As far back as 1997, Justice Kirby of the High Court of Australia ruled, obiter, that 'homo-
sexual and bisexual men and women' qualify for asylum under the category of those who 
suffer persecution on account of their membership in a particular social group.93 This 
passage was then cited with approval by the Australian High Court in its 2003 decision 
holding that sexual minorities constituted a particular social group for the purposes of 
refugee 1aw.94 A subsequent Federal Court decision also explicitly affirmed that 'bisexuals 
can form a particular social group for the purposes of refugee 1aw,.95 
Although it is clear, then, that bisexuals facing persecution are in principle eligible for 
refugee status in Australia, in practice reported refugee claims involving bisexuals appear to 
have been quite rare. A study of Australian sexual minority refugee determinations from 
1994 to 2000,96 undertaken by Jenni Millbank and Catherine Dauvergne, identified 204 
sexual minority refugee determinations, out of which 161 involved men and 43 involved 
women.97 In only two of the identified cases98 'the claimants self-identified as "bisexual" in 
their applications,.99 Moreover, in these two cases the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal 
(RRT), 'rather than considering bisexuals as a particular social group, assumed the appli-
cants to be homosexual,.100 The authors of the study also identified two further cases101 
where the applicants were identified by the RRT as either bisexual102 or ambiguous in 
their sexuality.103 In none of these four cases - all of which involved men - did the 
applicant succeed in securing refugee status. It is worth noting that during the same 
period the average grant rate in the Australian sexual minority refugee decisions identified 
by Millbank and Dauvergne was 22%,104 with gay men (26%) enjoying a significantly 
higher grant rate than lesbians (7%).105 
More recently, there have been some Australian cases where bisexual claimants have 
secured refugee status,106 or where federal courts have overturned negative RRT decisions 
involving bisexual clairnants. 107 Still - as with the experience of bisexuals in Canada and 
the United States - these positive decisions remain the exception, rather than the rule. 108 
Analysis of the experience of bisexual refugee claimants 
My review of the experience of bisexual asylum claimants in Canada, the United States, and 
Australia has highlighted that bisexuals are largely invisible in refugee determination 
systems, and that bisexuals seem to have a more difficult time securing refugee status 
than other groups of sexual minorities. It is, thus, pertinent to attempt to account for 
these two central observations. 
Bisexual invisibility 
There is very little information currently available on bisexual refugee claimants in 
Canada, the United States, or Australia. To begin with, as we have seen, there are few 
reported bisexual refugee decisions, that is, decisions published in official law reports. 
As we have also seen, however, according to data obtained from Canada's IRB, approxi-
mately 7-8% of sexual minority refugee claims made in Canada were identified by the 
IRB as involving bisexuals. There is no reason to think that the proportion of bisexuals 
among sexual minority refugee claimants in the United States or Australia is any lower. 
The issue of why there have been few reported bisexual asylum decisions is, therefore, a 
puzzle to be explored. 
While some refugee law scholars have discussed bisexuality within larger analyses of 
sexual minority refugee claims, there is relatively little scholarship that concentrates exclu-
sively on bisexual refugee claims. 109 One reason why bisexuals have drawn little attention 
in the area of international refugee law may be due to perceptions that refugee claims invol-
ving bisexuals are uncommon because decisions involving such claims have only infre-
quently been reported. This explanation, however, fails to fully account for the lack of 
attention to bisexual refugee claims as they arise. After all, the number of lesbian 
refugee claims is also low compared with the number of claims involving gay men, and 
yet significant scholarly attention has - quite rightly - been paid to analysing and attempt-
ing to improve refugee determinations involving lesbians. llo Moreover, one of the main 
preoccupations in the scholarly literature on lesbian refugee claimants is precisely to 
examine why women are under-represented in sexual minority refugee claims. III 
In my view, a more persuasive explanation for the lack of attention to bisexual refugee 
claimants in both reported decisions and in refugee law scholarship relates to a broader 
social phenomenon identified by scholars who have engaged closely with bisexuality. 
That social phenomenon is that bisexuals tend to be invisible in - or actively erased 
from - both sexual minority and mainstream communities. 112 
Many theorists tie the invisibility of bisexuality to a naturalised conception of human 
sexuality, in which human beings are understood to be either essentially heterosexual or 
essentially homosexual. l13 According to Kenji Yoshino, maintaining this naturalised 
binary understanding of human sexuality serves the interests of heterosexual communities, 
as heterosexuals inhabit a privileged position in this naturalised binary hierarchyy4 
Gagnon, Greenblat, and Kimmel echo this view, noting that 
Only a few thinkers [have begun] to consider what would happen if what appeared to be the 
most natural of all forms of conduct, the conventionalised sexual relations of women and men, 
was treated as problematic and the topic of history, anthropology, and sociology rather than 
biology, psychiatry, and individualist psychologies. To entertain the belief that the sexual 
desires of the majority are as much the result of a social construction as are the desires of 
all sexual minorities is a classic example of what is bad (perhaps even intolerable) to think, 
much less to practice. us 
It is important to appreciate, however, that this naturalised binary is also useful to many in 
sexual minority communities. 116 In particular, essentialised homosexual subject positions 
can form an important site for political mobilisation against heterosexist oppression. ll7 
Moreover, in many states around the world, sexual minorities have resorted to essentialist 
accounts of sexual orientations in order to bring constitutional challenges to heterosexist 
discrimination. lIB It is worth considering, in this regard, a remark by Justice Kirby, the 
first openly gay Justice of the Australian High Court: 
The advent of the Human Genome Project and the likelihood that, in many cases at least, sexual 
orientation is genetically determined, make it unacceptable to impose upon those affected 
unreasonable legal discrimination or demands that they change. It was always unacceptable; 
but now no informed person has an excuse for blind prejUdice and unreasonable conduct. If 
we are talking about the unnatural, demands that people deny their sexuality or try to 
change it, if it is part of their nature, are a good illustration of what is unnatural. An increasing 
number of citizens in virtually every Westem democracy are coming inexorably to this 
realisation. 119 
Now, Justice Kirby did not intend to suggest that human beings are genetically predeter-
mined to be either homosexual or heterosexual, to the exclusion of all other sexual 
identities. On the contrary, in both court decisions and extra-judicial writings, Justice 
Kirby regularly refers not only to gay men and lesbians, but also to bisexuals and other 
groups of sexual minorities. 120 Nonetheless, bisexuality complicates the essentialist _ 
and even biological determinist - account of human sexuality at the heart of the above 
passage. It is this account of human sexuality that, according to Yoshino, both heterosexual 
and many sexual minority communities have an interest in maintaining. 121 
Bisexuality challenges the essentialist account of human sexuality in at least two ways. 
First, many - though by no means all122 - bisexuals understand their sexual identity as 
involving some degree of choice, and often a highly politicised choice at that. 123 Liz High-
leyman, for example, describes how she came to identify as bisexual in the following terms: 
Some people become radicalised politically because of their oppression as gays, lesbians and 
bisexuals. Others questions their heterosexuality as a result of their radical politics ... It was 
within radical political circles, in fact, that I first got to know bisexual, gay and lesbian 
people. I began to wonder why so many people who shared my political ideals rejected 
traditional notions of gender and sexuality, and I started to question many of the assumptions I 
had grown up with. When I thought about it, it made little sense to rule out the romantic and 
sexual potential of half of humanity. 124 
Second, many bisexuals report that their sexual identity is fluid and undergoes shifts over 
time. Marie King, for example, notes that '[h]aving lived my life for a number of years as a 
heterosexual and then for an equally long period as a lesbian, I have lately arrived at a 
kind of bisexual synthesis'. 125 Others, such as Dave Matteson, suggest that their sexual 
identity - or the identity that they present to others - shifts even more frequently in 
response to social context: 
I made a decision fairly early in my public coming out to frequently use the word gay when 
speaking to the mainstream heterosexual community. I did not want to have my bisexuality 
seen as minimizing the side of me that is gay. On the other hand, when doing work in the 
gay community I have stressed being bisexual, to help fight the prejudice there against 
bisexuals. 126 
Or, as Starhawk puts it in more colourful terms, 
those of us who are bisexual, and honest, have to admit that our sexual orientation sometimes 
seems to change with the phases of the moon or the level of pollen in the air, or just with pro-
pinquity to whoever happens to be around. I honour the lesbian and gay activists who have 
made their sexual orientation a cornerstone of their identities, and respect the political need 
for doing so ... But if I'm honest about my own sexual identity, it has something to do with 
a deep reluctance to be pinned down. 127 
Taken together, because many in both heterosexual and sexual minority communities have 
an interest in preserving essentialist understandings of human sexuality, and because 
bisexuality challenges these understandings, bisexuality is often downplayed, ignored, or 
even erased. Yoshino calls this phenomenon 'the epistemic contract of bisexual 
erasure,.128 The result of this epistemic contract is that bisexuality is largely invisible in 
both heterosexual and sexual minority communities. 129 
It is worth reflecting on the possibility that the invisibility of bisexuality in the refugee 
determination systems in Canada, the United States, and Australia, as well as in some of 
the work of contemporary refugee law scholars, both partakes in and contributes to this 
epistemic contract of bisexual erasure. 
Low grant rates in bisexual refugee claims 
Once the invisibility of bisexual refugee claimants is challenged, one of the most pressing 
issues that needs to be explored is why bisexuals face much lower refugee claim grant rates 
than those involving gay men and lesbians in Canada, the United States, and Australia. 
A full analysis of the low grant rates for bisexual refugee claimants would require an 
extensive review of unpublished refugee decisions. The methodological challenges 
involved in such a review render this enterprise beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, based on the few reported decisions involving bisexual refugee claimants, a 
few tentative observations can be made. 
First and foremost, reported refugee decisions reveal troubling views about bisexuality 
held by refugee claims adjudicators. Perhaps the most flagrant example can be found in the 
comments made by an adjudicator at the Australian RRT in a case involving a bisexual 
refugee claimant from China. 130 In this decision, after accepting that homosexuals consti-
tute a particular social group for the purposes of the refugee definition,131 the RRT went on 
to note that, 
by stressing at the hearing that he is bisexual, the Applicant has not satisfied the Tribunal that he 
is reconciled to homosexual activity, lifestyle or even social association, or that he has any kind 
of preternatural homosexual identity or tendencies. It seems to the Tribunal that if this case 
were about political opinion, it would be as if the Applicant were saying that, at heart, he 
was a little bit disposed towards democracy but also eager to support authoritarianism; if it 
were about religion, it would be as if the Applicant, at heart, were a little bit Christian and 
a little bit atheist. There is significant equivocation in the Applicant's evidence and it goes 
against him. 132 
To understand this passage, it is important to emphasise that the RRT went on to note that 
'the notion of a group defined as "bisexuals" has been considered insofar as the homosexual 
side ofbisexual[ s] ... were an issue'. 133 The RRT, in other words, was prepared to entertain 
the possibility that bisexuals may meet the refugee definition where they faced persecution 
because of their 'homosexual side'. However, the RRT simultaneously found that the mere 
assertion of bisexuality was sufficient evidence to hold that the claimant did not, in fact, 
have a 'homosexual side' (that is, he was not 'reconciled to homosexual activity, lifestyle 
or even social association' and did not have 'any kind ofpretematural homosexual identity 
or tendencies ,).134 The understanding of homosexuality that animated such a holding is one 
that sees homosexuality as the absence or antithesis of heterosexual desire. Combined with 
the notion that bisexuals are only eligible for refugee status to the extent that they will other-
wise be persecuted on account of homosexuality, this understanding of homosexuality 
serves to erase the very possibility that bisexuals may be eligible for refugee status. 
This case was admittedly an outlier in that, as we have seen, several refugee tribunals 
and courts have accepted bisexuality as a basis for refugee claims. However, troubling com-
ments and findings made by adjudicators are not infrequent in refugee claims involving 
bisexuals. Sometimes the findings made by adjudicators in such claims are so disturbing 
that even the lawyers representing the governments will distance themselves from them. 
For example, in a recent Canadian federal court judicial review of a negative refugee 
determination involving an I8-year-old bisexual from Saint Lucia, 'counsel for the Minister 
conceded that some of the ... findings were "silly" and that the [adjudicator]'s language 
was "inappropriate",.135 The 'silliest' and most 'inappropriate' of the findings in question 
related to a purported inconsistency identified by the adjudicator in the claimant's failure 
to engage in sexual activity in Canada, notwithstanding her previous sexual 
experiences with both men and women: 
The claimant testified that she has not been sexually active [in Canada]. She [says she] is under-
age to go to gay clubs and she is busy with going to school. It is difficult to believe how a person 
sexually active with a male and two females from the age of 14 is living a celibate life now. 136 
This comment is disturbing because it closely matches negative stereotypes about bisexuals 
as sexually voracious or 'pathologically promiscuous'. 137 Indeed, in the cited passage the 
adjudicator appeared to reject the claimant's asserted bisexual identity merely because the 
claimant's behaviour (that is, 'celibacy') departed from these stereotypes. This indicates not 
only that individuals whose sexual identities depart from the stereotypes about human sexu-
ality held by adjudicators may have their refugee claims improperly denied, but also that the 
underlying understanding of human sexuality held by some adjudicators continues to be 
premised upon immutability. More specifically, this particular adjudicator was simply 
unwilling to accept that the claimant's sexual behaviour might change in response to 
different circumstances; the adjudicator seemed to be saying that if the claimant really 
had sexual relations with both men and women from the age of 14, then she would necess-
arily continue to do so at the age of 18, irrespective of the very different circumstances in 
which she now found herself. 
Although explicit remarks involving such extremely negative views of bisexuality have 
been relatively rare in reported refugee decisions involving bisexuals, troubling views of 
bisexuality were nonetheless frequently implicit in the types of evidence that refugee 
claims adjudicators cited when assessing the sexual identities of refugee claimants. For 
example, in a Canadian case involving a woman from Iran, the IRB cited evidence that 
the claimant intended to marry a man to conclude that the claimant was not, in fact, a 
bisexual. As the adjudicator put it, 
The claimant arrived in Canada with a male companion ... In response to the question as to 
whether they were planning to get married, the claimant replied, 'So far there is a commitment 
but officially we haven't signed a paper or anything.' ... [The claimant's] actions are those of a 
heterosexual woman. 138 
Similarly, in another Canadian case involving a woman from Hungary, the IRB held that the 
claimant was not a bisexual, partly based on evidence of prior different-sex sexual conduct: 
The claimant came to Canada because allegedly she was persecuted, among other reasons, on 
account of her sexual orientation. However ... the evidence shows that since last year she has 
been living with her boyfriend. 139 
These decisions were seriously problematic, as they failed to understand the reality of 
bisexual experiences. Indeed, one of the common themes of literature on bisexuality is 
the challenge of having one's bisexual identity taken seriously when one is in a sexually 
exclusive long-term relationship. The difficulty bisexuals encounter in this regard is that 
one's sexual identity is often read with reference to the gender of one's current or recent 
sexual partner(s). Consider, for example, the frustration expressed by Ruth Colker, a 
leading bisexual theorist, with being perceived as heterosexual because of her marriage 
to a man: 'in cases such as mine, most people probably just attach the label "married 
woman" to me with its assumptions about exclusive heterosexuality without even inquiring 
about my sexual orientation,.140 Similarly, as William Burleson notes, 'if a self-identified 
bisexual woman is in a monogamous relationship with another woman, she is now 
assumed to be lesbian,.141 
In order to challenge these views, it is important to emphasise that although some 
bisexuals have multiple recent or concurrent sexual partners of various sexes/genders/42 
others may be in long-term sexually exclusive relationships.143 Consider, for example, 
the following comments by Rifka Reichler: 
I am a 23-year-old married Jewish woman. I have never slept with a woman, nor do I expect to. 
Yet, I am bisexual ... and participate in the bisexual community. The newspapers and news-
letters I read, the conversations I have with friends, the buttons I hang in my study, and the 
organizations I join all affirm my bisexuality. The term bisexual affirms the part of me that 
loves women, now and in the future, regardless of who I am sleeping with. 144 
If one understands that sexual identity and sexual behaviour are not necessarily 
perfectly correlated, as the above comments by bisexual authors attest, then it seems 
unclear in what respect evidence that a refugee claimant maintains a sexually exclusive 
relationship could plausibly be read as challenging the credibility of his or her asserted 
bisexual identity. Rather, the fact that adjudicators in bisexual refugee claims cited such 
evidence suggests that they were actually concerned with establishing, not whether the 
claimant was bisexual, but rather where the claimant fit into an essentialist hetero j 
homosexual binary. 
A similar point can be made with regard to cases where evidence of same-sex sexual 
relationships was disregarded in assessing a refugee claimant's sexual minority identity. 
For example, in a recent Australian bisexual refugee case, the RRT, after noting that the 
male claimant had previously maintained sexual relationships with women, dismissed 
evidence regarding the claimant's ongoing sexual relationship with a man while he was 
in long-term immigration detention. 145 The RRT in particular noted that 
I do not accept that the Applicant is in fact bisexual ... I consider that his relationship with ... 
[another male immigration detainee] is simply the product of the situation where only partners 
of the same sex are available and says nothing about his sexual orientation.146 
In another Australian bisexual refugee case involving a man from Pakistan, the RRT 
stated: 
The Tribunal accepts that the Applicant might have enjoyed sexual play with other males when 
he was a teenager ... However, the Tribunal is not prepared to accept on the evidence before it 
that this was anything but a transient, youthful phase. 147 
Again, what is troubling about these remarks is that the adjudicators seemed to be 
preoccupied with uncovering the claimants' essential and unchangeable 'true' sexual 
identities. Evidence of same-sex sexual behaviour that the adjudicators understood as 
being affected by a particular social context - for example, youthful experimentation or 
sex-segregated incarceration - may therefore be disregarded. Thus, the following 
remarks by Millbank about the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal are apposite and can 
be extended to other refugee claims adjudication bodies: 
In situations where the applicant was seen as having some choice, or their sexuality any way 
fluid or temporary - if they could be seen as bisexual, young, sexually inexperienced generally, 
or having had only limited same-sex-sexual experiences, the Australian tribunal, in particular, 
was very reluctant to accept them ... under the social group category. 148 
In the end, if these troubling comments in the few reported cases involving bisexual refugee 
claimants reflect the overall trend among the unpublished cases, then one possible expla-
nation for the low refugee claim grant rates for bisexuals is that although in principle bisex-
uals who have a well founded fear of being persecuted for their sexual orientation are 
eligible for refugee status, in practice at least some refugee claims adjudicators will only 
grant refugee status to sexual minorities who display more traditionally understood 
sexual identities that fit within an essentialised homo jhetero binary. As previously men-
tioned, however, such a hypothesis needs to be tested further by reviewing decisions that 
were unpublished. 
Conclusion 
This paper has sought to shed light on an area of international refugee law that seldom 
attracts much attention: refugee claims made by bisexuals. It has demonstrated that 
bisexuals outside their countries of origin who have a well-founded fear of persecution 
on grounds of their sexual orientation in principle meet the refugee definition. However, 
it has also shown that, at least in Canada, the United States, and Australia, bisexual 
refugee claimants are much less likely to succeed in securing refugee status than are 
other groups of sexual minorities. As few decisions involving bisexual refugee claimants 
are published, further empirical analysis of unpublished decisions should be undertaken 
to identify the causes of the low success rates in bisexual refugee claims. On the basis of 
the few decisions that were published, I hypothesise that such research would reveal that 
among the reasons for the low grant rates include (1) the invisibility of bisexuality and 
(2) the disparaging views of some refugee claims adjudicators on bisexuality and their 
willingness to grant refugee status to bisexuals only to such extent as their cases appear 
to match adjudicators' perceptions of homosexual or lesbian sexual identities. 
Ultimately, we must bear in mind that the stakes in refugee determinations are immense. 
Negative and wrongly decided refugee claims will result in individuals being forcibly repa-
triated to countries where they will face persecution, torture, or even death. Accordingly, the 
current treatment of bisexual refugee claimants in Canada, the United States, and Australia 
provides cause for grave concern. 
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